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Resumo
Arquitetura de Paz e Segurança em África: Uma 
Análise Estratégica
Este é um estudo descritivo no campo dos estudos 
estratégicos, centrado numa abordagem holística 
dos diversos mecanismos e objetivos da Arquitetu‑
ra de Paz e Segurança Africana (APSA). A intenção 
é analisar os mecanismos desenvolvidos (ou em 
fase de desenvolvimento) pela UA e pelas organi‑
zações regionais africanas para abordar questões 
de paz e segurança em África, com o objetivo úl‑
timo de contribuir para uma melhor compreensão 
do contexto de segurança africano ao nível estraté‑
gico. Ao utilizar o modelo estratégico Ends‑Ways‑
Means, este estudo conclui que a APSA é uma 
estratégia de segurança viável para lidar com as 
principais ameaças em África. 
No entanto, há ainda lacunas importantes e sua efi‑
cácia depende de três ingredientes fundamentais: 
a vontade política dos Estados membros da UA, 
os desenvolvimentos ao nível regional, e do trata‑
mento das ameaças externas de uma forma muito 
mais consistente, abrangendo a dimensão “de se‑
gurança” da APSA na mesma extensão que a sua 
dimensão “de paz”.
Abstract
This is a descriptive study in the realm of strategy, 
focused on creating a holistic and meaningful picture 
about the mechanisms and purpose of the African Peace 
and Security Architecture (APSA). The overall intent 
is to analyze the mechanisms developed, or in a devel-
oping stage, by the African Union (AU) and regional 
organizations to address peace and security issues in 
Africa, with the ultimate goal of contributing to a better 
understanding of African security context at the strate-
gic level. By using the strategic model of Ends-Ways-
Means, this study concluded that the APSA is a viable 
security strategy to deal with the principal threats in 
Africa. However, there are still important shortcomings 
and its effectiveness is dependent upon three critical 
ingredients: political will of AU Member States, de-
velopments at the regional level, and by addressing the 
external threats much more consistently, covering the 
security dimension of the APSA in the same extent of 
its peace dimension.
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Introduction
The security architecture in Africa has evolved considerably over the past forty 
years. In the past, regional and sub‑regional African organizations expended most 
of their time dealing with the aftermath of conflicts instead of prevention and early 
resolution. The creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002 was the most significant 
step towards achieving a continental collective security system, enabling African 
countries to unite in seeking and developing collective solutions to prevent and 
mitigate conflicts. The AU rejected the approach of its predecessor (Organization 
of African Unity – OAU) – of absolute respect for national sovereignty – and adopt‑
ed a new policy in which the responsibility to protect human and people’s rights, 
and the right to intervene in a Member State are enshrined in the Constitutive Act, 
the basis of the new security architecture1 (Vines and Middleton, 2008: 8).
The Constitutive Act established provisions for intervention in the internal af‑
fairs of a Member State through military force, if necessary, to protect vulnerable 
populations from human rights abuses. Implicit in these provisions is the concept 
of human security and the understanding that sovereignty is conditional and de‑
fined in terms of a State’s capacity and willingness to protect its citizens (Powell, 
2005: 1). In order to provide an operational dimension to the security provisions of 
the Constitutive Act, the AU developed capacities for early warning, quick reac‑
tion, conflict prevention, management and resolution. At the same time, it placed 
“itself within a robust security system that builds on the strengths of African re‑
gional organizations and the United Nations (UN), and that draws on extensive 
support from other international actors” (Powell, 2005: 1).
1  The first reference to this concept is in the Protocol that established the Peace and Security 
Council of the AU, in 2002, in his Article 16, naming it the “overall security architecture of the 
Union”.
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Figure 1 – The African Peace and Security Architecture
Source: Created by the author.
This new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) pursues African so‑
lutions to African problems. The APSA is grounded on two pillars: the Common 
African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP)2 and the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC)3 (see figure 1). To fulfill its tasks, the PSC has three primary instruments at 
its disposal: the Panel of the Wise (PW), the Continental Early Warning System 
(CEWS) and the African Standby Force (ASF). These three instruments, together 
with a special fund for financing missions and activities related to peace and secu‑
rity (the Peace Fund) and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Man‑
agement and Resolution, round out the elements of the APSA.
A Strategic Analysis
The APSA is a very complex security system, relying on regional and continen‑
tal intergovernmental organizations, on the will of African peoples and on the sup‑
port of a countless number of partners. Covering all processes that are underway 
in the APSA with the appropriate level of depth is a colossal task. The strategic 
2 AU’s central policy document on security, signed in 2004.
3 AU’s most important organ on security issues.
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model Ends-Ways-Means provides the adequate paradigm to analyze the strategic 
importance of the APSA. It allow to describe and analyze the suitability of the 
Ends established for the APSA, particularly the extent of its contribution for the 
accomplishment of the desired effect of promoting and consolidating peace and 
security on the African continent. 
In addition, it describes and analyzes the application of the four classic stra‑
tegic Ways – diplomatic, military, informational and economic – to the particular 
case of the APSA, as well as its respective Means. Ways and respective Means are 
analyzed together to scrutinize its overall feasibility (e. g. the extent in which the 
Ways can be accomplished by its Means). In order to do that it is indispensable to 
analyze the development stage of each of the Means: Diplomatic (PSC, Commis‑
sion and PW), Military (ASF), Informational (CEWS) and Economic (Peace Fund).
Figure 2 – The Ends‑Ways‑Means Strategic Model
Source: Created by the author.
The Ends of the APSA
In the realm of strategy, Ends are objectives or goals that answer the question of 
“what” one is trying to achieve. The CADSP, signed in 2004, is essentially a strate‑
gy based on a set of principles, objectives and instruments with the overall desired 
effect of promoting and consolidating peace and security on the continent (Touray, 
2005: 636). The CADSP establishes the security strategic goals for the APSA (AU, 
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2004: 8). They are “essentially to respond to both internal and external threats ef‑
fectively” (Touray 2005: 643). The CADSP classifies internal and external threats as 
dangers to the common defense and security interests of the continent, undermin‑
ing the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability (AU, 2004: 3).
Table 1 – Main African Common Security Threats
Source: African Union (2004).
Analyzing these threats, some inferences can be drawn. First, the internal 
threats are related to the peace dimension of the APSA (addressing conflicts) and 
the external threats are related with to the security dimension (addressing other 
security threats). Second, the number of threats identified in the CADSP is very 
high. The document identifies thirty‑one different threats to the common defense 
and security interests of the continent. Although these threats are grouped into 
internal4 and external to the African continent, they are extremely diverse (in its 
nature, capabilities or intentions) making it very complex and challenging to find 
balanced Ways and Means to mitigate all of these threats. 
Third, most of these threats are interconnected and affect the development 
and security of the continent. In today’s strategic context, in Africa or elsewhere, 
situations and problems such as terrorism, civil wars, organized crime or extreme 
4  The internal threats are organized in four clusters: inter‑state conflicts/tensions; intra‑state 
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poverty, are interrelated and cannot be addressed separately. In order to mitigate 
all these threats, comprehensive approaches are required, overcoming narrow pre‑
occupations and working across the whole range of issues, in a coordinated and 
integrated way.
Fourth, The CADSP does not specifically addresses maritime or cyber security 
threats. These two types of threats pose dangers to the security interests of the 
African continent, undermining the promotion of security and stability. As one can 
see in the Gulf of Aden or in the Gulf of Guinea, issues like illegal fishing, piracy, 
arms and drugs trade, oil bunkering or sea pollution, are extremely dangerous 
threats that require strategic mitigation. Likewise, cyber security threats have an 
enormous destabilizing potential. The low cost and virtual nature of cyber space 
makes it an attractive domain for use by those who seek to use cyber space for 
malicious purposes. As Internet penetration rates increase across the African con‑
tinent, so does the risk of cyber‑attacks, which threatens the protection of financial 
information, personal data, and intellectual property.
The Ways and Respective Means
In the strategic model, Ways are courses of action that explain “how” the Means 
will be used, and Means are the resources or instruments that will be used to ex‑
ecute the strategic concept defined by the different Ways. The Ways and Means 
analyzed in this section are related by its nature: the diplomatic Way with the PSC, 
the Commission, and the PW; the military Way with the ASF; the informational 
Way with the CEWS; and the economic Way with the Peace Fund.
The Diplomatic Ways and Means
The Protocol that created the PSC establishes in its Article 6 two primary diplo‑
matic Ways to achieve the strategic goals: preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, 
particularly by the “use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry” (AU, 
2002: 8). Preventive diplomacy strives to resolve a dispute before it escalates into 
violence. Peacemaking, generally, seeks to promote a ceasefire and to negotiate an 
agreement. 
The APSA is based on a paradigm that recognizes preventive diplomacy as cen‑
tral to address peace and security challenges in Africa. African Leaders consider 
that the comprehensive and coherent use of preventive diplomacy is important 
in creating the conditions for sustainable peace. According to South Africa Presi‑
dent, Jacob Zuma, preventive diplomacy initiatives are more cost‑effective than 
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the deployment of peacekeepers once a conflict has broken out. Therefore, it is es‑
sential that the “efforts of both the African Union and the numerous sub regional 
organizations across the continent working on preventive diplomacy be respected 
and supported by the UN and the international community as a whole” (Zuma, 
2011: 6).
The other diplomatic Way established by the Protocol is based on the use of 
diplomatic methods, mainly mediation, good offices, conciliation and enquiry. 
All four methods are anchored in Article 33 of the Charter of the UN, under its 
Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Mediation processes have often been em‑
ployed in attempts to resolve conflicts on the African continent. In recent years, the 
AU and sub‑regional organizations have played an important role in mediating 
hotspot issues in Africa, namely in the Sudan, Burundi and Madagascar. “Their 
success shows that regional and sub‑regional organizations have unique politi‑
cal, moral and geographic advantages in preventing and resolving local conflicts” 
(Jiechi, 2011: 16).
However, the APSA still requires an institutionalization of mediation process‑
es. In order to move from ad hoc mediation initiatives to more institutionalized and 
systematic ones the AU peace and security agenda needs to enhance its mediation 
mechanisms and processes. “Partnerships among African states; between the AU 
and regional organizations; the AU, EU and UN; and between AU and civil society 
organizations are important in order to ensure that there is cooperation, coordina‑
tion, joint solutions and support among and within the actors in the field of conflict 
resolution and mediation” (ACCORD, 2009: 34).
The Peace and Security Council
The PSC is the central diplomatic instrument of the APSA. It is the point of 
contact with international organizations such as the UNSC and the Political and 
the Security Committee of the EU. The Protocol relating to its creation establishes 
that the PSC performs functions in the areas of preventive diplomacy and peace‑
making, including the use of good offices, mediation5, conciliation and enquiry 
(AU, 2002: 8). It is empowered to take diplomatic initiatives and action it deems 
appropriate with regard to situations of potential and actual conflicts. To that end, 
it uses its discretion to affect entry, whether through the collective intervention 
of the Council or through its Chairperson and/or the Chairperson of the Com‑
5  An example of using mediation: through a PSC decision, the AU assumed the political respon‑
sibility of mediating between the government of Sudan and armed resistance movements the 
Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army.
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mission, the PW, and/or in collaboration with regional mechanisms for conflict 
prevention, management and resolution (AU, 2002: 14). The PSC may establish 
subsidiary bodies that include ad hoc committees for mediation, conciliation or en‑
quiry, consisting of an individual State or group of States (AU, 2002: 12). 
The PSC has become a focus of “collective security decisions by African for Af‑
ricans” (Sturman and Hayatou, 2010: 57). In response to urgent security issues, it 
has been able to act more decisively than the larger Assembly of 53 Member States 
of the AU and has shifted the AU from a tradition of non‑interference in domestic 
affairs to a new approach, using sanctions and more assertive regional diplomacy 
(Sturman and Hayatou, 2010: 57). The focus of the decisions, so far, has been on 
conflict management and resolution, rather than conflict prevention6. This is due to 
capacity constraints and the intensity and complexity of conflicts, but also to a lack 
of political will, reflecting the power politics and interests in Africa (Sturman and 
Hayatou 2010, 69). Consensus7 has remained the norm by which all decisions have 
been reached. This mode of decision‑making seems not only time‑consuming, but 
by institutionalizing it, it allows Member States with a strategic interest in a partic‑
ular conflict to block some kind of intervention (Sturman and Hayatou, 2010: 69).
It is important to highlight that in just eight years the PSC has made signifi‑
cant achievements in addressing the various conflict and crisis situations and has 
significantly improved its methods. However, the PSC faces still important chal‑
lenges. PSC authorizations to deploy peacekeepers to Burundi (AMIB), Comoros 
(AMISEC), Sudan (AMIS) and more recently Somalia (AMISOM) exposed a major 
gap between the PSC’s willingness to authorize such missions and the AU’s ability 
to implement them. Shortage of resources‑‑human and material‑‑has emerged as a 
major shortfall. This mandate‑resource gap may in the long run erode its credibil‑
ity (AU, 2010a: 26). Additionally, there has been some lack of interaction between 
the PSC and other APSA components, primarily due to the fact some of the com‑
ponents are still being operationalized (AU, 2010a: 31). Institutionally, the PSC is 
mandated to work with the Chairperson of the Commission; a link between the 
PSC and the PW is missing (AU, 2010a: 28).
6  “Nor has the PSC devoted much attention to the nonmilitary dimensions of security, such as 
environmental degradation, organized crime, and disease. This limited focus is the result of 
analytical and operational capacity deficiencies, as well as the regularity of hot crises, which 
makes it difficult for the PSC to tackle the upstream and structural aspects of conflict mitiga‑
tion” (Williams, 2011: 7).
7  The PSC decisions are generally based on the principle of consensus. However, in case of failu‑
re to reach a consensus, decisions on procedural matters are by a simple majority and substan‑
tive matters by a two‑thirds majority of members eligible to vote (Sturman and Hayatou, 2010: 
66). 
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The Diplomatic Role of the AU Commission
The AU Commission has a very important diplomatic role within the APSA. 
Under the authority of the PSC, and in consultation with all parties involved in 
a conflict, the Chairperson of the AU may deploy efforts and take all initiatives 
deemed appropriate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Therefore, at his 
own initiative or when requested by the PSC, he may use his good offices, either 
personally or through special envoys, special representatives, the PW or the Re‑
gional Mechanisms, to exercise diplomatic efforts (AU, 2002: 15).
The principal operational mechanism of mediation at the AU is, in fact, the 
Commission. It implements mediation interventions and takes decisions regard‑
ing their composition and nature. The mediation efforts have so far taken the form 
of ad hoc deployment of special envoys in identified conflict areas on the continent, 
with the support from the Conflict Management Directorate of the Commission 
(ACCORD, 2009: 10).
The Panel of the Wise
The creation of the PW was motivated by the need for finding homegrown 
solutions to African challenges, and by the African cultural belief of the wisdom, 
discretion and trustworthiness of elders. Within this cultural framework, similar 
structures are being developed in the REC’s.
The PW can diplomatically intervene in crises through several ways. It can be 
by facilitating the establishment of channels of communication between the AU 
and parties engaged in a dispute; by carrying out fact‑finding missions; by con‑
ducting shuttle diplomacy between parties; by encouraging parties to engage in 
political dialogue; carrying out reconciliation processes; or by assisting and advis‑
ing mediation processes. The PW selects up to three critical crisis situations per 
year, which it will monitor constantly (Abdellaoui, 2009: 6). It adopted five criteria 
for engaging in crisis situations.
The PW became operational in December 2007, and has met ten times since 
then. It is expected to meet at least three times a year, or more often if necessary. 
So far, its meetings have focused on three themes: election related conflicts; non‑
impunity, justice and national reconciliation; and women and children in armed 
conflicts in Africa (AU, 2010a: 56).
The PW has undertaken fruitful and important tasks in preventive diplomacy. 
Through confidence‑building missions, the PW has engaged with several coun‑
tries and regions affected by crisis or conflicts (AU, 2010a: 56). However, the PW 
faces some constraints. The PW does not appear in the structure of the Commis‑
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sion raising budgetary, ownership and sustainable issues; therefore, it does not 
receive any funding through the AU regular budget. All its activities and those 
of its Secretariat have been funded through partner support, which is an unsus‑
tainable situation and hampers its activities (AU, 2010a: 56). According to Murithi 
and Mwaura (2010: 82), the PW also needs staff complement,8 namely a robust 
mediation support unit within the Commission and significant input from quali‑
fied political officers who have experience in bilateral and multilateral negotiation 
settings.
The PW faces also some challenges. First, the importance of ensuring buy‑in 
from the rest of the APSA mechanisms as well as AU Member States; this is vital 
for recognizing the importance of its role and therefore for its efficacy. Second, the 
importance of ensuring comprehensive coordination; without it there is a danger 
that the activities of the PW will be routinely undermined. Third, the clarification 
of which stage of the diplomatic process it intervenes and whether the PW will 
be empowered and appropriately staffed by the AU and its partners to fulfill its 
mandate effectively. “A pragmatic appreciation of the nexus between preventing 
conflicts, making peace once conflicts have escalated, and keeping peace following 
agreements will determine how effective the PW will be” (Murithi and Mwaura, 
2010: 90).
It seems that the PW has the potential to be the most innovative and effective 
diplomatic Means of the APSA. Not only because was conceived within the cul‑
tural framework of the African continent, but also because it is not (or should not 
be) constrained by the political considerations of the Commission or the PSC.
The Military Ways and Means
The Protocol that created the PSC establishes in Article 13 two primary generic 
military ways to achieve the strategic security goals: peace support missions and 
military intervention. These two primary ways are divided in seven possible meth‑
ods (AU, 2020: 19).
Both ways are primarily focused on the internal threats. It is important to note 
that in any relevant strategic document of the APSA9 are defined military ways of 
dealing with external threats, such as terrorism or cross‑border crimes. This is cor‑
roborated by the existing scenarios for employing the ASF, ranging from small‑scale 
8  The Panel’s Secretariat has only two professional staff and an administrative assistant for its 
eleven core functions (AU, 2010: 57).
9  Such as the Protocol that creates the PSC or the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense 
and Security Policy.
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observation missions to forcible military intervention. These scenarios focus on peace 
support operations and do not authorize the ASF to engage with external threats 
or other security challenges, such as those associated with antipiracy and maritime 
security. This land‑focused approach can be too narrow for addressing all the dimen‑
sions of a complex peace‑support operation, as the case of Libya demonstrated.
In addition, the participation in humanitarian assistance or in efforts to address 
major natural disasters is not envisioned in the scenarios for the employment of 
the ASF. Generally, military organizations possess important capabilities‑‑such as 
transport, logistics and the ability to deploy rapidly‑‑to participate in disaster relief 
operations. The CADSP mentions that the ASF “shall provide humanitarian assist‑
ance to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population in conflict areas (as well as 
support efforts to address major natural disasters)” (AU, 2004: 18). However, this 
intention was not translated into the existing scenarios of the ASF. 
So far, the AU has tended to concentrate its military responses on conflict man‑
agement, rather conflict prevention, through peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
operations. The AU authorized military missions in Burundi, Sudan/Darfur, So‑
malia and Comoros. Military operations have been deployed to “supervise, ob‑
serve, monitor, and verify the implementation of ceasefire agreements or to help 
broke cease‑fires between government and rebel groups” (Söderbaum and Hettne, 
2010: 22). 
Military intervention is a critical issue that is addressed in the APSA. Accord‑
ing to its Constitutive Act, the AU has “the right to intervene in a Member State 
pursuant to decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances: namely 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU, 2002a). Scenario 6 for the 
employment of the ASF addresses these situations, namely “in genocide situations 
where the international community does not act promptly” (AU, 2005: 3). Despite some 
legal doubts about this right to intervene (beyond the scope of this essay) what is 
critical in this issue is the political will to apply this very coercive military measure 
when it becomes imperative. This is true for the AU and for all other organizations, 
like the UNSC, that need to deal with similar, and always sensitive, situations of 
intervention. 
The African Standby Force
The African Standby Force is the primary military instrument for implement‑
ing the decisions of the PSC. It is based on standby arrangements with the conti‑
nent’s five sub‑regions, each providing a brigade‑sized contribution, supported by 
civilian police and other capacities. According to a recent assessment report of the 
AU, released in 2010, “there is no doubt that efforts to operationalize the ASF have 
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registered good progress although, the degree of progress varies from region to 
regions” (2010a: 51). Despite achieving major progress developing the ASF, there 
are still significant shortcomings.
Bachmann analyzed and summarized some of these shortcomings: the AU and 
the regions lack mission planning capacity; the police and civilian components of 
the ASF remain significantly weaker than their military counterparts; communica‑
tions and interoperability between military, police, and civilians in the field remain 
low; administrative, financial and human resources management capacity remain 
too weak compared to the task at hand; African missions remain heavily depend‑
ent on external support for the entire range of their logistics needs, from strategic 
deployment to field logistics, as well as for their CIS (communications and infor‑
mation systems) needs. “Financial dependence on external donors characterizes 
African capacity‑building efforts as well as operations” (Bachmann, 2011: 13).
The AU and the sub‑regions have made significant progress towards establish‑
ing a viable regional peace support capability. However, the progress and status of 
readiness of each of the regional brigades is different. It seems that the NASBRIG 
is lagging in the operationalization of the standby arrangement, despite NARC’s 
economic and military potential of its members. This is due to the fact there was 
no prior collaboration among the North African States at this level. Hence, they 
had to create all these structures to meet the requirements of the ASF (Alghali and 
Mbaye, 2008: 38). In addition, the progress has been hampered by a “lack of mul‑
tilateral cooperation in the region, exemplified by the Algerian‑Moroccan standoff 
over Western Sahara” (Burgess, 2009: 3) and by the recent events in Libya. 
Logistics depots are important and a basic mission capability needed for the 
ASF. Recently, the AU and RECs launched projects focused on improving the 
shortcomings of logistics depots. This effort, however, “does not seem to have 
gone much beyond studies to identify the appropriate locations of the depots and 
initial drafts of their contents and costs”10 (Bachmann, 2011: 13).
The civilian components (including police) are still underdeveloped in all sub‑
regions. The civilian components are essential for addressing multidimensional 
peacekeeping and peace‑building operations. Still, according to the AU, “these 
components have been put in place in all sub‑regions but there are still some cru‑
cial gaps” (AU, 2010b: 51).
To date, none of the RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) has signed a formal 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with their Members for the deployment 
of their troops. This aspect is fundamental for the operationalization and employ‑
10  Following protracted studies and political discussions, the decision to create a continental de‑
pot in Douala, Cameroon, was finally approved by the defense and security ministers in De‑
cember 2010 (Bachmann, 2011: 40).
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ment of the ASF, requiring that the AU, RECs and RMs adopt binding legal docu‑
ments with Member States for the employment of pledged troops. 
The gap between aspiration and implementation remains wide. Protocols and 
framework documents are in place, and institutional structures are being built; 
but despite recent developments, operational capacity remains limited in the face 
of rising demands and expectations (Cilliers, 2005: 16). In December 2010, a third 
roadmap was proposed by an AU specialized technical committee to focus on the 
steps needed to reach Full Operating Capability (FOC) for a limited Rapid De‑
ployment Capability (RDC) by 2012, and FOC for the ASF as a whole by 2015 
(AU, 2010b: 1). These are ambitious objectives. In order to achieve them, the AU 
and the ASF need to overcome important shortfalls and vital challenges. There 
are shortfalls in the areas of coordination, force composition; planning; doctrine, 
procedures and training; interoperability and communications; and logistics (AU, 
2010b: 1). Some of these deficiencies will need better management of administra‑
tive and human resources to improve; however, the greatest resource shortfall re‑
mains internal financial contributions and dependence on external donors.
Therefore, two big challenges emerge: the first one is related to balance. Military 
operations, equipment and logistics are expensive. African leaders need to find a 
balance between investing in this continental and regional security mechanism and 
in the immediate challenges of governance, poverty, and development. Both dimen‑
sions are not mutually exclusive as there is no development without security. 
The biggest challenge is African will and ownership. If the AU Member States 
really want to develop African solutions for African security problems, they need 
to be more pro‑active and innovative. The cultural paradigm, we do it this way, 
because that’s the way we do it, often inhibits appropriate and effective responses to 
challenges. As Cilliers pointed out, sometimes Africans “deliberately take a back 
seat, engaging in an old game of extracting the maximum benefit from their ben‑
efactors” (Cilliers, 2008: 18). This logically will lead to more external engagement 
and to less African commitment, hindering African progress and development, 
and therefore, African solutions. Undoubtedly, African need vast financial and 
technical support from donors and partners; but it is vital that the “AU and the 
various regions ensure that they assume ownership and drive donor support and 
not the other way around” (Cilliers, 2008: 18).
The Informational Ways and Means
Generally, the purposes of the informational Ways are disseminating and col‑
lecting information in order to achieve strategic objectives (Worley, 2008: 4). The 
protocol that created the PSC establishes that, in order to facilitate timely and ef‑
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ficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa, the information gathered 
through the CEWS shall be used by the Chairperson of the Commission to “advise 
the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and rec‑
ommend the best course of action” (AU, 2002b: 17).
The AU Informational Way – materialized by the CEWS – to achieve the AU 
Ends is focused on the internal threats, at least theoretically, namely on inter‑state 
conflicts/tensions and intra‑state conflicts/tensions. The Indicators Module of the 
CEWS, which trigger the early warning cycle (and provides the information for 
the strategic analysis and the engagement with decision‑makers), is based on a 
framework of generic indicators derived ex negativo from documents adopted by 
the African Heads of State and Government (AU, 2008: 6). All those documents 
are directly related with conflict prevention, human rights, good governance and 
democracy. No indicators were developed for external threats, such as terrorism 
or cross‑border crimes.
Despite the nature and purpose of the CEWS, there are always sensitive issues 
when using information related with events that occurred inside a Member State. 
The former Director of Peace and Security at the AU, Ambassador Sam Ibok, men‑
tioned some of them, including: the barrier of national sovereignty, which often 
hampered efforts to collect reliable data and information, as well as timely interven‑
tion; the issue of data ownership, which often created problems on the flexibility of 
the use and dissemination of data collected; and the lack of political will on the part 
of Member States (Cilliers, 2005: 19). These issues are critical and must be openly 
addressed by the AU, if the goal is effectively mitigate internal and external threats.
The Continental Early Warning System
The CEWS is one of the key instruments of the APSA. A recent assessment 
report indicated that significant progress has been achieved in the operationaliza‑
tion of the CEWS, and the system has been able to “provide reliable and up‑to‑date 
information on potential, actual and post‑conflict situations” (AU, 2010b: 32). 
However, the same report mentioned before identifies important shortfalls. 
The level of development of each of the sub‑regional early warning systems is 
different, hindering higher level operation. Data collection and reporting are rela‑
tively advanced at the continental level, in ECOWAS and in IGAD, but not yet 
effective in CEN‑SAD, EAC and COMESA; in most other RECs, progress has been 
achieved in establishing policy frameworks, specific concepts and approaches to 
early warning (AU, 2010b: 33). Conflict analysis and development of response op‑
tions are just beginning in some regions; only IGAD is building up an integrated 
response mechanism at this stage (AU, 2010b: 33). There are still technical and 
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financial constraints to directly link each of the RECs monitoring and observation 
centers to the AU Situation Room (AU, 2010b: 34). There is a shortage of staff in 
the AU Situation room11 and within the early warning systems of the REC’s. It is 
also necessary to enhance the analytic capacity of staff. “Without substantial staff 
reinforcement it is questionable whether the monitoring units in certain RECs will 
be established” (AU, 2010b: 34).
Efforts to strengthen engagement with senior management and political deci‑
sion makers in some of the RECs remain embryonic (AU, 2010b: 35). Coordination 
and collaboration with relevant international organizations to build functional and 
result‑oriented partnerships is needed. The AU has not been able to engage with 
civil society organizations (CSO) because of the diversity of civil society and the 
very different level of development in different States and regions (AU, 2010b: 
36). Different kinds of support for the CEWS were drawn from a relatively small 
number of donors12. In general, donor support has been forthcoming with ade‑
quate timing and at sufficient levels. However, “most partners tend to prioritize 
one or two organizations rather than continent‑wide CEWS support based on a 
pragmatic approach which match the advancement of the individual organiza‑
tions” (AU, 2010b: 36).
All these issues are important and need to be adequately addressed. Some of 
them are structural, such as the liaison and coordination between the AU and the 
RECs, and the human, technical and financial sustainability of the system. The abili‑
ty of the CEWS to engage AU decision‑makers appropriately and influence decision‑
making is the most critical issue. This is also its central role, which ultimately will en‑
able the development of appropriate response strategies by the AU. Also imperative, 
however, is the capability to develop effective outreach strategies to engage other 
stakeholders outside the AU. The CEWS is an open source system and, by its nature, 
it is desirable to remain as such. Without this vital link with civil society – including 
non‑governmental organizations, media, academia and think thanks – the flow of 
information will be limited and partial, hindering its primary purpose of facilitating 
timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.
The Economic Ways and Means
Usually, in the realm of strategic theory, the economic ways are associated with 
11  There are ten Situation Room assistants working on a 24/7 shift basis (AU, 2010b: 34).
12  “Programmed/budget funding is provided by EU, UNDP, GTZ and DANIDA. Flexible, ad‑
hoc funding is also provided by UNDP, UK, GTZ and USAID” (AU, 2010b: 35).
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tariffs and quotas, economic sanctions, incentives and foreign economic aid, with 
the purposes of protection or coercion, but also providing a basis for developing 
other instruments of power or influence (Worley, 2008: 6).
The AU can impose economic sanctions under certain conditions. Article 23 
of the AU Constitutive Act establishes that any Member State that fails to comply 
with the decisions and policies of the AU may be subjected to sanctions, “such as 
the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and 
other measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assem‑
bly” (AU, 2002a: 12). Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Union 
add that economic sanctions may be applied against regimes that refuse to restore 
constitutional order, such as trade restrictions and any additional sanction as may 
be recommended by the PSC (AU, 2002c).
The AU sanctions regime addresses three main types of situations: nonpay‑
ment of membership contributions (arrears), non‑compliance with the decisions 
and policies of the AU, and unconstitutional changes of government (AU, 2002c). 
All these situations include economic sanctions ranging from provision, by the 
AU, of funds for new projects in Member States to trade restrictions. In the last few 
years, the AU applied sanctions to some Member States. The AU PSC has issued a 
series of sanctions against Togo, the Comoros, Mauritania, and recently on Guinea, 
Niger and Madagascar,13 however with mixed results in terms oversight, monitor‑
ing and the verification of implementation (Lulie, 2010).
In order to enhance AU capacity to ensure Member States implement what they 
bargained for, the AU decided to create a Sanctions Committee within the PSC. The 
committee will have an important role in recommending to the PSC, AU and other 
legitimate bodies the actions deemed appropriate in response to violations, and in 
lifting or hardening sanctions (Lulie, 2010).
Economic sanctions may have an important role in addressing some of internal 
threats to Africa. However, it is questionable if the AU has the full capacity to ef‑
fectively impose these sanctions. As mentioned in a recent report of the Chairper‑
son of Commission “over and above the suspension measure, international part‑
ners, particularly the UNSC, should lend more effective support to the sanctions 
decided by the AU” (AU, 2010: 6). This international support is a fundamental 
condition. Still, two other conditions are needed. “The first one is technical which 
includes the design and the infrastructure of the management of implementation. 
The second is political or related to the will to act quickly, evenhandedly and con‑
sistently” (ISS, 2009: 2).
13  In the case of Madagascar the economic sanctions included: the freezing of funds, other finan‑
cial assets and economic resources (AU, 2010c: 2).
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The Peace Fund
It is imperative to stress that the Peace Fund is not an economic instrument to 
be used on realm of economic sanctions or other punitive measures. Its role is to 
provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other 
operational activities related to peace and security in Africa. However, it has an 
economic14 (financial) nature and, above all, is one of the instruments of the APSA, 
contributing for achieving its peace and security objectives.
The Peace Fund is the continental mechanism created by the AU to financially 
support the APSA. It is made up of financial appropriations from four sources: 
regular budget of the AU, voluntary contributions by Member States, non‑Member 
States contributions and miscellaneous receipts (AU, 2007: 102). With regard to 
the contribution from the AU Member States, only twelve percent15 of its annual 
budget is allocated to the fund (AU, 2010b: 60). 
However, the Peace Fund is virtually empty and “there is cause for concern 
regarding the funding of peace operations in Africa” (AU, 2007: 102). Some Mem‑
ber States have difficulties in honoring their financial obligations, and by 2009 the 
AU’s Peace Fund had a negative balance (AU, 2010b: 60). Between 2004 and 2007, 
only 1.9% of the total resources channeled through the Peace Fund came from Afri‑
can Member States; the rest was provided by external partners (AU, 2010b: 59). The 
EU is so far the largest funding partner of the AU (Gänzle and Grimm, 2010: 75).
A high‑level audit of the African Union in 2007 recommended that the Com‑
mission Chairperson should intensify his efforts at mobilizing funds and resources 
for AU peacekeeping operations from within the Continent and the Diaspora. In 
addition, the report stressed the need of the African countries to contribute sub‑
stantially to AU peace operations and to pay regularly their respective contribu‑
tions (AU, 2007: 172). If the Member States meet their financial obligations, the 
AU’s dependency on external aid will be reduced, and that sustainability and 
ownership of the APSA will be guaranteed (AU, 2010b: 60).
Conclusions
Military operations, equipment and logistics are expensive. African leaders 
need to find a balance between investing in this continental and regional security 
mechanism and in the immediate challenges of governance, poverty, and devel‑
14  This is the reason why it is methodologically analyzed under the economic ways.
15  In 2010, a UN report mentioned that these contributions would not be sufficient to deploy and 
sustain the current peace support operations, and proposed its enhancement (UN, 2010: 14).
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opment. Both dimensions are not mutually exclusive as there is no development 
without security. This represents an enormous challenge to Africa requiring cour‑
age, will, wisdom and trust. As previously mentioned, the Ends of the ASPA are 
essentially to respond to both internal and external threats effectively. All these 
threats are often interrelated and cannot be addressed separately. In order to miti‑
gate all these threats, comprehensive and integrated approaches are required, 
overcoming narrow preoccupations and working across the whole range of issues. 
Only by this way will the APSA be a viable security strategy to deal with the prin‑
cipal threats in Africa.
Some recommendations can be suggested.  These recommendations are based on 
three major potential gaps in the APSA, beside the lack of human, technical and finan‑
cial resources: political will of AU Member States to implement the strategy; the dis‑
crepancies between the regional level and the continental level; and the lack of Ways 
to address adequately the security dimension of the APSA (i.e. the external threats).
Political will is absolutely vital to operationalize all mechanisms of the APSA. 
Very sensitive issues such as military intervention in a Member State with regards 
to grave circumstances, information sharing, implementing sanctions or address‑
ing transnational threats, require strong political commitment and will of AU 
Member States in order to be effective. Otherwise, the lack of political will can be 
exploited by the threats ‑ internal or external ‑ to discredit the AU and its Member 
States, thus hindering obtaining its strategic goals.
Another gap is the discrepancy between the regional and continental levels. 
The APSA is a very complex security system, relying on regional and continental 
intergovernmental organizations. At the continental level, there has been signifi‑
cant progress in the development of the AU organizational structures. However, 
most of the mechanisms of the APSA are completely dependent on the RECs and 
RMs, such as the regional brigades or the regional warning systems. Without the 
proper development and operationalization of these regional instruments, there 
will be no success for the APSA.
The other gap is the lack of Ways to address adequately the security dimen‑
sion of the APSA. The African Peace and Security Architecture has, according to 
its name, two dimensions: peace and security. However, most of the Ways and 
Means of the APSA are primarily focused on the peace dimension of the APSA, not 
addressing effectively, or simply not addressing, the security dimension. Threats 
such as terrorism, mercenaries, cross‑border crimes, cyber threats, or piracy re‑
quire effective response strategies, both at the regional and continental levels. This 
will require cooperation between military, security forces (i.e. police), civil society 
and external partners, but also the development of certain capabilities such as such 
as air, naval, Special Forces and cyber protection components, not present in the 
current structure.
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These three issues are critical and will require African leaders’ focus and also 
support and contribution of external partners. 
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